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Is DuE? COURTS AND SCIENCE-POLICY DISPUTES.
By David M. O'Brien. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1987.
Pp. xviii, 242. $22.50.

WHAT PROCESS

David M. O'Brien's 1 book What Process Is Due? Courts and Science-Policy Disputes is a discussion of the law's role in controlling
technological risks and uncertainties. For the most part, O'Brien does
this through a collection of stories about the major disputes around
which the law in this area has been shaped. At the outset, O'Brien
promises to do more than provide the reader with anecdotes. He offers an intriguing new conceptualization of these disputes. They are,
O'Brien suggests, "trilemmas" requiring responses to three different
sets of competing demands: (1) the need for a scientific basis for regulation; (2) the requirement that choices be politically responsible; and
(3) the requirement that some degree of procedural fairness be afforded those who are interested in the outcome. Unfortunately,
O'Brien fails to work this conceptualization into the stories that he
tells; and fails to glean any persuasive prescriptive insights from this
framework. Thus, the book is left to stand as a collection of extended
stories.
What Process Is Due? in many ways parallels O'Brien's earlier
work, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics. 2 Storm
Center was well received as a useful compilation that chronicled the
Court's internal dynamics in the f~ce of an increasing caseload and
changing political role. But many observers felt that Storm Center
lacked analytical and prescriptive elements. That work presented, but
failed to explain, interesting events. One reviewer observed that "it is
Mr. O'Brien's historical and statistical evidence, not the conclusions
he draws, that will make 'Storm Center' fascinating to historians and
valuable to those who want to debate the Court's future." 3
Unfortunately, What Process Is Due? shares the earlier work's
flaws, but not its strengths. Unlike Storm Center, What Process Is
1. The author is a professor in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. His prior works include STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLmcs (1986); THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNow: THE
SUPREME CoURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1981); PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1979); The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 8 (1980);
and Of Judicial Myths, Motivations, and Justifications: A Postscript on Social Science and the
Law, 64 JUDICATURE 285 (1980).
2. D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLmcs (1986).
3. Mackenzie, Rehnquist's Inheritance, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1986, § 7 (Book Review) at 14;
see also Book Notice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1987) (reviewing D. O'BRIEN, STORM
CENTER: THE SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN PoLmCS (1986)) ("Storm Center's method is
more derivative than original, its use of the material more encyclopedic than instructional, and
its effect more corroborative than groundbreaking.").
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Due? breaks no new ground and presents no new data or evidence.
And the development of federal review of agency decisions is not
nearly so photogenic a subject as the machinations of Supreme Court
decision making. Too esoteric to be engaging storytelling, and too anecdotal to be serious scholarship, the work is left without a reader.
O'Brien argues that "disputes over the scientific basis for and the
basic value conflicts in regulating risk are structured according to adversarial processes and forced into the courts" (pp. 32-33). This
''judicialization" is a "uniquely American response" (p. 34); a result of
"our uniquely adversarial culture and its relation to democratic politics" (p. 33). He offers virtually no comparative analysis defending his
assertion that this response is "uniquely American," 4 however. And
while he deems this judicialization an "imperfect response to the
problems of managing risks" (p. 34), he never suggests an alternative.
As O'Brien goes on to describe instances of judicial review, he treats
the premise of judicialization as an unquestioned given.
O'Brien begins with a survey of the irreducible uncertainties confronting any attempt to regulate carcinogenic risks. Scientists are not
in agreement as to whether environmental pollution has led to an increase in the cancer rate (pp. 14-19). While cancer rates have undoubtedly increased, this might be the result of demographic changes
in the population (people live longer). 5 Furthermore, O'Brien points
out, the methodology of carcinogenicity experiments - risks extrapolated from extremely high doses in a rodent population - is inherently suspect. There is no agreement in the scientific and regulatory
community on how to extrapolate these data to low doses (p. 29), or
on whether there is any safe threshold for carcinogens. 6 Nor is there
any agreement on the role individual lifestyle factors play in cancer
rates (p. 22). Because these factors and others are so uncertain, the
adoption of any model of carcinogenicity is a political - as opposed to
scientific - choice (p. 19).
O'Brien then details the shortcomings of private law litigation
through a rapid sketch of the avalanche of litigation that followed the
identification of asbestos as a carcinogen. He concludes, rather unremarkably, that private law litigation is a "slow, inefficient, and ex4. P. 34. O'Brien observes, in one conclusory sentence, that "In· England, science-policy
disputes are settled in a parlimentary [sic] fashion and with deference to the expertise of the civil
service." P. 34.
·
5. Several works have announced a cancer epidemic, including R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING
(1962) ands. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER (1979). Refutations of this view are found in
E. EFRON, THE APOCALYPTICS: CANCER AND THE BIG LIE (1984); Gori, The Regulation of
Carcinogenic Hazards, 208 SCIENCE 256 (1980); and Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer:
The Need for a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (1980). See generally pp. 15-34, and
sources cited therein.
6. P. 30. O'Brien refers the reader to E. EFRON, supra note 5, and OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
AssESSMENT, U.S. CoNGRESS, AssESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING CANCER
RISKS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT (1981).
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pensive" solution to the problems presented by substances of unknown
toxicity (p. 59). The reader finds few original observations, but copious references to more thorough works in the field.
O'Brien continues with a discussion of the inability of judges to
deal effectively with complex - and probably insoluble - scientific
factual questions. Most of this section is devoted to a detailed narrative of the Reserve Mining controversy,7 one of the first major environmental lawsuits of the 1970s. This storytelling is what O'Brien
does best. His account is refreshingly broad: in most of the legal literature, that controversy is reduced to little more than its holding, and is
treated more as an incremental step in the evolution of the rules of
causation than as the manifestation of a broader, cultural awakening. 8
The Reserve Mining controversy involved Reserve Mining's operation of a taconite ore refining plant on the shores of Lake Superior in
northern Minnesota. The process required huge amounts of water,
and produced substantial amounts of water-borne taconite tailings9 as
waste. When the plant was constructed in the 1940s, there was no
evidence that the dumping of tailings would cause environmental damage to the lake (p. 82). Potential harms to human health were not
extensively considered. 10 As public concern over the environment
grew, and the effects of the dumping on life in the lake became clearer,
the dumping of tailings came under increasing scrutiny. Twelve years
of litigation intended to stop disposal of the tailings saw several state
court suits seeking revocation of Reserve Mining's discharge permits
(pp. 84-85), an offensive suit by Reserve Mining challenging the state's
water pollution control laws (p. 85), a lawsuit in federal court brought
by the federal government seeking an injunction preventing further
7. Judicial dispositions of various stages of the controversy are found at United States v.
Reserve Mining Co., 419 U.S. 802 (1974) (denying certiorari, but indicating, in an opinion joined
by a total of four justices (the number necessary for a grant of certiorari), that the Court would
consider the case if a final judgment had not been rendered by January 31, 1975); Reserve Mining
Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 185 (8th Cir. 1976) (removing the district court judge who was
handling the proceedings for "shed[ding] the robe of the judge and ... assum[ing] the mantle of
the advocate"); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane); United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974); Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 267 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1978); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst,
256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977).
8. See, e.g., Baker & Markoff, By-Products Liability: Using Common Law Private Actions to
Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 99 (1986); Glicksman, Federal
Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1985); Rosenberg,

The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ''Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 91
HARV. L. REv. 849 (1984).
9. Taconite tailings are the by-products of the refining process. Taconite ore is a low-grade
iron ore containing 20 to 25 percent iron material. "Tailings" are the residual materials of
crushed ore and water left after the iron has been extracted from the ore. P. 21. The tailings are
virtually identical to asbestos, and are similarly carcinogenic when inhaled, but the danger posed
by ingested water-borne asbestos (and therefore taconite tailings) is uncertain. See pp. 90-94.
10. This was before the era of the environmental impact statement. Even if a statement had
been required, it is doubtful that this harm would have been recognized because the toxicity of
asbestos and thus taconite tailings was not appreciated at the time.
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discharges, and two Eighth Circuit rulings. 11 O'Brien ties events in
the controversy to shifting presidential politics, legislative fits and
starts, and the historical evolution of scientific views on the carcinogenicity of the tailings.
Eventually, the Fifth Circuit ordered restrictions on tailing discharges on the grounds that taconite leaching into the water supply
endangered public health, and was therefore subject to proscription
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 12 Prior cases had
asked whether harm to the public was "more likely than not." The
government could not meet those traditional proof burdens in this
case: while the inhalation of asbestos fibers 13 - and therefore the
identical taconite fibers - was known to be carcinogenic, the harmful
effects of ingestion were only suspected. The court conceded that "it
[could not] be proven that the probability of harm is more likely than
not" but concluded that the potential severity of the harm justified a
relaxation of traditional burdens. 14
This section exemplifies the book's shortcomings as well as its
strengths. O'Brien does not explain the implications of the important
legal result of the Reserve Mining controversy, and does not comment
on the fact that the case appears implicitly to settle the dispute over
carcinogenicity in favor of the no-threshold paradigm, 15 at least where
the potential harm is severe enough. If the book is about the allocation of decisional authority, such a result ought not to go unnoticed.
O'Brien does refer to some intriguing explanations of the failure of
adjudication that have been developed in other works, but he never
applies them in a careful way to his own observations. For example,
he notes that judicial difficulty with science-policy disputes may be the
result of the "polycentricity" of the disputes, a term that has been used
by Professor Fuller to describe the inadequacies of adversary litigation
in dealing with disputes characterized by a lack of any principle or
standard against which an asserted "right" can be measured, and by a
multiplicity of interests and affected parties, each of which is affected
by a decision made with respect to another party. Fuller provides the
example of a woman bequeathing a collection of paintings to two different museums "in equal shares[]":
[T]he disposition of any single painting has implications for the proper
11. Pp. 88-106.
12. 514 F.2d at 529 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(l) (1970) (repealed 1972)).
13. See supra note 9.
14. 514 F.2d at 520; see also Certified Color Mfrs. Assn. v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284, 297-98
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Reserve Mining) ("where the harm envisaged is cancer, courts have recognized the need for action based upon lower standards of proof than otherwise applicable");
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Reserve Mining favorably in upholding
the EPA's regulation of the lead content of gasoline even though the risk of harm was not "certain"); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
15. See supra note 6.
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disposition of every other painting. If [one museum] gets the Renoir, the
Gallery may be less eager for the Cezanne but all the more eager for the
Bellows, etc. If the proper apportionment were set for argument, there
would be no clear issue to which either side could direct its proofs and
contentions. 16

This aptly characterizes environmental disputes, if the apportionment
of environmental risks and benefits were substituted for the paintings,
and the two museums were replaced with some far greater number of
constituencies. Such disputes are more appropriately dealt with
through legislative and contractual solutions (p. 79); and O'Brien correctly observes that this explains some of the difficulty that judges
have had with science-policy disputes. 17 But O'Brien does not explain
how these pressures affect judges uniquely in science-policy disputes.
One insight broached, then left untouched, is his mention of school
desegregation and reapportionment cases as instances where polycentricity and proof problems have not proved impassable barriers to effective judicial intervention (p. 106). Those cases are arguably as
polycentric as science-policy disputes: they involve at least as many
constituencies, each affected by any decisions made with respect to any
other parties, as in environmental disputes; and there is a similar lack
of a firmly established principle of adjudication to which proofs can be
directed. O'Brien notes that the judicial role in resolving these latter
disputes has been largely unchallenged (p. 106); but never asks or attempts to explain why these might be different from science-policy
disputes.
O'Brien also chronicles the problems with judicially supervised administrative solutions. He tells the story of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission's (CPSC) ban on Tris, a fire retardant sprayed on
children's clothing, as an example of the pathologies of the evolving
relationship between agencies and 'courts (pp. 129-43). When the
CPSC first received data suggesting that Tris was a carcinogen, it
banned the substance without waiting for further proof. The CPSC
did not afford interested parties any opportunity for a hearing, and did
not assess the economic impact of its ruling. O'Brien argues that this
haste was provoked by the threat of litigation rather than an informed
risk assessment, and that this is yet another instance of the shortcomings of judicialization (p. 142).
O'Brien then makes some more general observations about the distorting effect of the threat of litigation. He notes that judicialization
engenders delay and inefficiency (pp. 146-49), and in support of this
cites both the costs of rule making and the costs of compliance with
16. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394 (1978).
17. Pp. 102-04. For a more detailed discussion of the polycentric nature of environmental
disputes, see Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18
UCLA L. REV. 429, 458-59 (1971).
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those rules (p. 148). But how much of these costs are attributable to
the judicialization of the rule-making process? How much is a cost of
information gathering that would be necessary, or at least desirable,
no matter what form the rule making takes? What is needed here, and
is lacking, is some quantification of the percentage of those costs that
can be attributed to judicialization alone, and a discussion of whether
the judicially imposed informational requirements are independently
desirable.
The last section of the book (pp. 153-86) discusses the role of federal appellate courts in environmental disputes as it evolved through
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council 1s the Benzene case, 19 and the Cotton Dust case. 20 These stories, too, are told without being tied to any descriptive or prescriptive
framework. Here O'Brien devotes far more space to the legal doctrines involved in those cases, and less to the factual and political
background of the disputes, than with the other discussions in the
book. The section contains little of the detail that makes his discussion of Reserve Mining worth reading. Because his doctrinal synopses
do not go beyond the cases themselves, they have little to add.
If the book has a common theme, it is that judicial resolutions of
science-policy disputes ought "not purport to resolve scientific questions but the underlying normative conflicts" (p. 190). To the extent
that O'Brien's book makes that fact perfectly clear, it is a useful contribution to the literature. But O'Brien's own observations, ironically,
indicate that judges and lawyers are already painfully aware of the
difficulty, and value-laden nature, of those conflicts.
-

Gregory B. Heller

18. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that a court reviewing a regulatory decision cannot impose
adversarial procedures on agency rule-making, but also sanctioning "heightened scrutiny" of the
regulatory decision-making process). Pp. 162-63.
19. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's benzene regulations needed
to be based on a finding of significant risk and could not be premised on a policy which presumed
such risk at extremely low levels of exposure once carcinogenic risk at higher levels was
established).
20. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (holding that the Occupa·
tional Safety and Health Act did not require a cost-benefit analysis in support of regulations).
The case "warn[ed] lower courts that they may not on their own require agencies to undertake
more rigorous analysis than clearly required by Congress or mandated by the White House." P.
176.

